Revolutions and corruption

Explainer of Ammons et al. (2024), Public Choice. Not the journal article.

Citation: Ammons, J., & Shakya, S. (2024). Revolutions and corruption. Public Choice. Download

Facts¶

Main finding¶

Successful nonviolent and violent revolutions produce null effects on corruption; when controlling for education’s moderating effect, violent revolutions actually induce higher corruption.

One caveat¶

Correlation between revolutions and corruption could reflect reverse causation or omitted variables; cannot rule out that revolutions may prevent corruption increases that would otherwise occur.

Policy hook¶

Revolutions are celebrated as anti-corruption programs, but do they actually reduce corruption? Do violent and nonviolent revolutions produce different corruption consequences?

Data and setting¶

Revolutionary campaigns since 1900; corruption measures from Varieties of Democracy database; violent and nonviolent revolution comparison.

Research design (plain language)¶

Empirical analysis testing three hypotheses: revolutions increase, decrease, or have no effect on corruption. Education moderation effects examined for heterogeneous impacts.

PDF or DOI¶

Publisher page

Why it matters¶

Revolutions are justified partly as anti-corruption programs - the logic goes that overthrowing a corrupt regime installs cleaner governance. This paper’s finding that revolutions don’t reduce corruption is sobering. Violent revolutions actually correlate with higher corruption afterward (though education can reduce this). For citizens and activists, the implication is that overthrowing a regime doesn’t automatically fix institutional corruption; new institutions require building, not just destruction. The finding also complicates stories of revolutionary legitimacy: if a revolution doesn’t deliver on anti-corruption, its other results matter more (land reform, equity, rights). For policy makers in post-revolution transitions, the result shows the need for deliberate institutional design - anti-corruption doesn’t emerge spontaneously. The education effect is also significant: educated societies may lock in anti-corruption norms better. For comparative politics, the finding suggests that violent and nonviolent revolutions should be evaluated separately on results, not grouped as a category.