Revolutions and corruption

Publication id: ammons-2024-revolutions-corruption
Status: verified

Citation: Ammons, J., & Shakya, S. (2024). Revolutions and corruption. Public Choice. Download

Facts¶

Policy hook¶

Revolutions are celebrated as anti-corruption interventions, but do they actually reduce corruption? Do violent and nonviolent revolutions produce different corruption consequences?

Main finding¶

Successful nonviolent and violent revolutions produce null effects on corruption; when controlling for education’s moderating effect, violent revolutions actually induce higher corruption.

Data and setting¶

Revolutionary campaigns since 1900; corruption measures from Varieties of Democracy database; violent and nonviolent revolution comparison.

Research design (plain language)¶

Empirical analysis testing three hypotheses: revolutions increase, decrease, or have no effect on corruption. Education moderation effects examined for heterogeneous impacts.

One caveat¶

Correlation between revolutions and corruption could reflect reverse causation or omitted variables; cannot rule out that revolutions may prevent corruption increases that would otherwise occur.

PDF or DOI¶

Publisher page

Why it matters¶

Revolutions are justified partly as anti-corruption interventions—the logic goes that overthrowing a corrupt regime installs cleaner governance. This paper’s finding that revolutions don’t reduce corruption is sobering. Violent revolutions actually correlate with higher corruption afterward (though education can mitigate this). For citizens and activists, the implication is that overthrowing a regime doesn’t automatically fix institutional corruption; new institutions require building, not just destruction. The finding also complicates narratives of revolutionary legitimacy: if a revolution doesn’t deliver on anti-corruption, its other outcomes matter more (land reform, equity, rights). For policymakers in post-revolution transitions, the result underscores the need for deliberate institutional design—anti-corruption doesn’t emerge spontaneously. The education effect is also significant: educated societies may institutionalize anti-corruption norms better. For comparative politics, the finding suggests that violent and nonviolent revolutions should be evaluated separately on outcomes, not grouped as a category.