Political economy of Vermont's anti-fracking movement
Political economy of Vermont’s anti-fracking movement¶
Publication id: hall-2020-vermont-anti-fracking
Status: verified
Citation: Hall, J. C., Scarcioffolo, A. R., & Shakya, S. (2020). The political economy of Vermont’s anti-fracking movement. Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice. Download PDF
Facts¶
Policy hook¶
Vermont became first US state to ban hydraulic fracturing (Act 152, signed May 12, 2012) despite having zero known natural gas reserves.
Main finding¶
Democratic Party affiliation and campaign donation levels were significantly related to voting to ban fracking. Median voter characteristics (poverty, education) showed effects in baseline models that disappeared in robustness checks. Results indicate legislator characteristics, not constituent preferences, primarily drive expressive voting.
Data and setting¶
Vermont General Assembly voting on H.464/Act 152; 167 legislators (150 House, 30 Senate) from 2010-2012 term. Legislator data from VoteSmart (party, donations, education, birthplace). Median voter characteristics from 2010 American Community Survey at district level (80+ socioeconomic variables).
Research design (plain language)¶
Double-selection post-LASSO methodology to handle high-dimensional confounders (3,320+ variables including interaction terms). Examined both legislator mechanism effects and median voter mechanism effects separately. Limited probability model with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
One caveat¶
Vermont’s lack of known gas reserves makes this purely expressive voting context, limiting generalizability to instrumental policy decisions. Some median voter effects (poverty, retirement income) became insignificant in robustness checks with interaction terms. Findings specific to symbolic policy outcomes where economic factors may matter less.
PDF or DOI¶
Why it matters¶
Expressive voting in federal systems has spillover consequences across jurisdictions. Understanding that symbolic policy decisions are driven primarily by legislator ideology and party rather than constituent demand has implications for how we interpret political representation, regulatory federalism, and the role of special interests in policymaking.